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There are many observables warning us about the probability of this wild card. For example: Western investors in Africa have either left or reduced their presence as a result of the recent economic and financial crises. Consequently, Chinese SOEs (practically unaffected by the global recession) have been able to take up abandoned businesses in Africa. According to the OECD, China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 has transformed the country’s trade, investment and financial regimes and the recent announcement of a “go global” policy has lead to an average annual OFDI growth rate of 116% from 2000 to 2006, which is certainly one the fastest in the world. And, since then, China has made even bigger investments in more than twenty African countries, including: Algeria, Angola, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe, among others. The “aggressiveness” of Chinese investment is reflected in the large variety of investment areas, which include: services (mainly banking, construction, insurance and transport), oil and mining (including iron, ferrochrome, chromium ore, gold and copper, among others), telecommunications and manufacturing (e.g. electronic goods, automotive industry, etc.). Among the political signals we can see the government officials in Africa openly declaring that China is seen as a new strategic partner and that the fact that there is no colonial history between Africa and China makes the relationship extremely special. In addition, Chinese partnerships come without conditions as opposed to Western deals which typically impose a number of trade and aid policies often disguised with “human rights” labels.
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submitted
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archived
